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DNA AS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
AND A NARROW FRAMEWORK FOR
ADDRESSING THE PERCEIVED PROBLEMS
CAUSED BY GENE PATENTS
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ABSTRACT
Concerns about the alleged harmful effects of gene patents—
including hindered research and innovation and impeded patient
access to high-quality genetic diagnostic tests—have resulted in
overreactions from the public and throughout the legal profession.
These overreactions are exemplified by Association for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, a 2010 case in the
Southern District of New York that held that isolated DNA is
unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The problem with
these responses is that they fail to adequately consider the role that
gene patents and patents on similar biomolecules play in facilitating
investment in the costly and risky developmental processes required to
transform the underlying inventions into marketable products.
Accordingly, a more precisely refined solution is advisable. This Note
proposes a narrowly tailored set of solutions to address the concerns
about gene patents without destroying the incentives for companies to
create and commercialize inventions derived from these and similar
patents.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Gene patents have always been controversial. Some
commentators object to gene patents on the ground that genes and
the human genome are “the common heritage and inheritance of
2
mankind.” Others object to gene patents because of ethical
considerations, arguing that gene patents restrict patient access to
3
genetic diagnostic tests developed using patented genes. Still others
object to gene patents on the ground that they potentially impede
4
foundational research rather than stimulate innovation.
These collective concerns have engendered overreactions
exemplified by a 2010 case in the Southern District of New York,
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark
5
Office (Myriad I), which held that “[b]ecause . . . isolated DNA is not
markedly different from native DNA as it exists in nature, it
6
constitutes unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”
Similarly, the U.S. government has taken a position against the
patentability of isolated DNA, at least in the context of a genomic
7
DNA sequence. Other responses, though less extreme, have still
been excessive. For example, a 2010 report on the impact of gene
patents by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health,
and Society (SACGHS) for the Department of Health and Human

1. For the purposes of this Note, gene patents are “patent claims to isolated nucleic acid
molecules whose sequences correspond to human genes, intergenic DNA (DNA located
between genes), or mutations that occur in the human body.” SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND
LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 15 (2010).
2. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 442–45
(2002).
3. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 38–45
(addressing the effects of gene patents on access to genetic testing).
4. See generally Kate Murashige, Patents and Research—An Uneasy Alliance, 77 ACAD.
MED. 1329 (2002) (evaluating the claim that patents such as gene patents inhibit scientific
progress).
5. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For clarity and
readability, this Note uses “Myriad I” to refer to this district court opinion and “Myriad II” to
refer to the Federal Circuit opinion in the same case, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
6. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Myriad
II, 653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406) (concluding that “isolated but otherwise unaltered genomic
DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101”).
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8

Services suggests the creation of broad exemptions from liability for
anyone who infringes gene patents “while making, using, ordering,
offering for sale, or selling a genetic test for patient care purposes” or
9
while “us[ing] patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.”
The problem with these responses is that they fail to adequately
consider the role that gene patents and patents on similar
biomolecules play in facilitating investment in the costly, lengthy, and
risky developmental processes required to transform the underlying
10
biological discoveries and inventions into marketable products.
Because the patent system provides the incentive for translating basic
research into marketable products in this context, a more precisely
11
refined solution is advisable.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the
underlying biology of genes and the appeal of gene patents,
summarizes the objectives and patentability requirements of the U.S.
patent system, explains how those requirements have been applied to
gene patents, and discusses the alleged problems created by gene
patents. Part II describes and critiques two noteworthy responses to
those problems: the Myriad case—including the response of the U.S.
government to that case—and the SACGHS gene-patent report.
Finally, Part III proposes a narrowly tailored set of solutions to
address the concerns about patients and innovation without
destroying the incentives required to create and commercialize
inventions derived from gene patents.
I. PATENT LAW AND GENE PATENTS
A. Genes and Their Appeal as Patentable Subject Matter
1. The Biology of Genes. Genetic information flows from
12
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to ribonucleic acid (RNA) to proteins.
Though the nucleotide subunits of DNA encode basic biological
8. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1.
9. Id. at 94–95.
10. See Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, Research Tool Patents After Integra v.
Merck—Have They Reached a Safe Harbor?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 372
(2008) (“Under [the incentive to invest] theory, the patent system . . . facilitates investment into
costly and risky development processes that are necessary to transform a ‘mere’ invention into a
marketable product.”).
11. See infra notes 184–91 and accompanying text.
12. BRUCE ALBERTS, ALEXANDER JOHNSON, JULIAN LEWIS, MARTIN RAFF, KEITH
ROBERTS & PETER WALTER, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 331 (5th ed. 2008).
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information through “a four-letter alphabet that spells out biological
13
messages,” proteins are the primary molecules responsible for
14
putting that information into action.
15
Genes, the “functional units of heredity” within a cell, are the
portions of DNA that correspond to a protein or a related set of
16
protein variants. Cells use—or express—the instructions encoded in
17
genes to produce proteins in two steps. In the first step—
transcription—the cell copies the gene from the DNA to an
18
19
intermediary called RNA. After the cell processes the RNA, the
information in the RNA is used in a second step—translation—to
20
generate the end-product protein. Through this process, cells can
“synthesize and accumulate different sets of RNA and protein
21
molecules” according to need.
2. The Appeal of Gene Patents. Although genes as they exist
22
within human bodies are not patentable, genes that are isolated,
purified, and modified are attractive as patentable subject matter for
23
several reasons. For example, gene patents are useful for developing
24
genetic diagnostic tests. Because genes are ultimately informational
templates for the proteins that carry out most of the functions within
25
26
the cell, gene mutations can produce adverse outcomes such as

13. Id. at 199.
14. Id. at 6. Proteins perform most of the cell’s functions, including “direct[ing] the vast
majority of chemical processes in the cell,” as well as “maintaining structures, generating
movements, [and] sensing signals.” Id.
15. Id. at 204.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 142.
20. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at 4.
21. Id. at 411.
22. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (internal
guidelines) (“A patent on a gene covers the isolated and purified gene but does not cover the
gene as it occurs in nature. Thus, the concern that a person whose body ‘includes’ a patented
gene could infringe the patent is misfounded.”).
23. See Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413, 18,414
(Apr. 11, 2005) (notice) (“Much of the value associated with the commercial use of these
technologies involves nucleic acid-based diagnostics, potential gene therapy applications, and
the development of new DNA and RNA-based therapeutics.”).
24. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 20–35
(discussing the effects of gene patents in promoting the development of genetic diagnostic tests).
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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27

disease. Consequently, genetic testing can provide information
about the predisposition of a particular person to develop a particular
disease and the likely responsiveness of a person to a particular type
28
of therapy.
Gene patents are also attractive because of the potential to use
isolated, purified, and modified genes in the development of novel
drugs. Three examples of categories of drugs that can be developed
29
using gene patents are recombinant-protein therapeutics, gene30
31
therapy drugs, and RNA interference (RNAi) therapeutics.
Recombinant-protein therapeutics—proteins derived from a selected
32
recombinant gene —are useful for treating diseases when the
increased presence of a particular protein would have a beneficial
33
effect for the patient. The concept behind gene therapy is similar: “a
26. Mutations include deletions, inversions, translocations, and substitutions of an incorrect
nucleotide for a correct nucleotide within a DNA sequence. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at
555.
27. See, e.g., Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, The Hallmarks of Cancer, 100
CELL 57, 57 (2000) (explaining that cancer development involves “mutations that produce
oncogenes with dominant gain of function and tumor suppressor genes with recessive loss of
function”).
28. See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 835, 837 (“Genetic testing can serve a number of objectives: predictive testing of an
asymptomatic individual whose family history suggests an inherited risk of a particular disease,
diagnostic testing of a symptomatic individual to confirm the presence of genetic correlates to a
specific disease, and genetic testing of diagnosed individuals to optimize drug therapy in
pharmacogenomic applications.”).
29. See generally Florian M. Wurm, Production of Recombinant Protein Therapeutics in
Cultivated Mammalian Cells, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1393 (2004) (discussing the
diversity of manufacturing approaches that are capable of producing therapeutic proteins from
recombinant mammalian cells).
30. See generally Roland W. Herzog, Ou Cao & Arun Srivastava, Two Decades of Clinical
Gene Therapy—Success Is Finally Mounting, 9 DISCOVERY MED. 105 (2010) (discussing recent
progress in human gene therapy).
31. See generally David Bumcrot, Muthiah Manoharan, Victor Koteliansky & Dinah W.Y.
Sah, RNAi Therapeutics: A Potential New Class of Pharmaceutical Drugs, 2 NATURE CHEMICAL
BIOLOGY 711 (2006) (discussing the molecular mechanics of RNAi, studies of RNAi
administration in animal models of human disease, and clinical trials of RNAi therapeutic
candidates).
32. Recombinant DNA is “produced by splicing together two or more DNA fragments.”
ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at 533. Recombinant DNA technology is useful for modifying a
particular gene or for dramatically increasing expression of a particular gene to produce large
amounts of a given protein. See id. at 514 (“Using . . . recombinant DNA methods . . . , any gene
can be modified to produce its protein with a special recognition tag attached to it, so as to
make subsequent purification of the protein . . . simple and rapid.”).
33. One example is Activase, a recombinant tissue plasminogen activator developed by
Genentech Inc. for treating heart attacks. Activase, GENENTECH, http://www.gene.com/gene/
products/information/cardiovascular/activase/insert.jsp (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
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functional copy of [a] defective gene is introduced [into the patient’s
body] to replace the missing function” caused by a defect or mutation
34
in the native gene. RNAi therapeutics, however, use only small
fragments of a gene and exploit a natural regulatory mechanism
within the cell to degrade RNAs encoded by a particular gene,
thereby decreasing the amount of the corresponding protein that is
35
produced. This type of therapeutic is effective for treating diseases
36
driven by the presence of a particular pathological protein.
B. Objectives of Patent Law and the Patentability Requirements
The foundation of the U.S. patent system is Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
37
respective Writings and Discoveries.” This clause and the federal
patent laws Congress has enacted pursuant to it envision the
stimulation of innovation through the creation of a delicately
38
39
constructed balance : in exchange for a time-limited, exclusive right
40
to make, use, or sell an invention, an inventor provides a disclosure
to the public that is sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in
41
the relevant field to make and use the claimed invention.
34. Herzog et al., supra note 30, at 105. There have been over one thousand gene-therapy
clinical trials. Michael L. Edelstein, Mohammad R. Abedi & Jo Wixon, Gene Therapy Clinical
Trials Worldwide to 2007—An Update, 9 J. GENE MED. 833, 833 (2007).
35. Bumcrot et al., supra note 31, at 711.
36. One example is ALN-RSV01, an RNAi therapeutic in Phase II clinical trials. ALNRSV01 silences a gene required for the replication of respiratory syncytial virus. RSV Infection,
ALNYLAM PHARM., http://alnylam.com/Programs-and-Pipeline/Partner-Programs/index.php
(last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and
useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.
The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding
invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that
unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws since
their inception.”).
39. The term of protection for utility patents is twenty years from the effective filing date
of the patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
40. See id. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain a . . . grant to the patentee . . . of the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the United States . . . .”).
41. Id. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
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To be eligible for this limited monopoly, a claimed invention
must meet several requirements. The invention must first be
patentable subject matter, defined by statute to include “any
new . . . process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
42
any new . . . improvement thereof.” As the Supreme Court has
recognized, this broad language reflects Congress’s intent that, under
43
the Patent Act of 1952, patentable subject matter should “include
44
anything under the sun that is made by man.” The scope of
patentable subject matter is not without limits, however, as the Court
has held that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
45
ideas”
are not patentable because “[s]uch discoveries are
‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively
46
to none.’”
Even if a claimed invention reaches the threshold of patent
47
48
eligibility, it is still not patentable unless it is useful, novel, and
49
nonobvious. Under Supreme Court precedent, an invention is
considered useful if it has “substantial utility” and can provide an
50
identifiable “specific benefit” in its current form. An invention has
substantial utility if it “has a significant and presently available

enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”).
42. Id. § 101.
43. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 797 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.).
44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5
(1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
45. Id. (providing “a new mineral discovered in the earth” and “the law of gravity” as
examples of unpatentable subject matter).
46. Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)).
48. Id. § 102 (setting forth the novelty bars to patentability). Section 102’s requirements
will change slightly when the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.), goes into effect.
For a summary of the changes, see Howard Skaist & Ted Karr, Guest Post—Defining Prior Art
Under the Leahy-Smith AIA, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 13, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2011/09/guest-post-defining-prior-art-under-the-leahy-smith-aia.html.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
50. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–36 (1966) (noting that “a patent is not a
hunting license” but rather is “compensation for [the] successful conclusion” of a search for
something useful).
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51

benefit to the public” and an invention provides a specific benefit if
52
it has “a use which is not so vague as to be meaningless.”
53
An invention is novel if it has not been previously disclosed.
Relevant considerations listed by statute include whether the
54
invention was “known or used by others in this country,” “patented
55
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,”
“described in [a published] application for patent [or patent granted
56
on an application] . . . by another filed in the United States,” or
“made in this country by another inventor who ha[s] not abandoned,
57
suppressed, or concealed it.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has held that novelty does not exist if “each and every
element [of the claimed invention] is found, either expressly or
58
inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”
Even if an invention is novel, it may still be unpatentable if it
fails to satisfy the nonobviousness requirement. Obviousness bars
patentability in cases in which “the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
59
which said subject matter pertains.” Several factors are relevant in
determining whether an invention is obvious, including whether there
was “some motivation or suggestion to combine” or modify relevant
60
prior art references to create the claimed invention, whether the

51. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that substantial utility requires
that an invention have real-world value in its current form rather than after further research).
52. Id. (observing that to satisfy the specific-utility requirement, the claimed invention
must “provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public”).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (g).
54. Id. § 102(a).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 102(e).
57. Id. § 102(g)(2).
58. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Prior art
includes any reference or information made available to the public before the date of a patent
applicant’s invention. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 360 (4th ed. 2007) (“Any reference having an
effective date before the critical date is considered part of the prior art and may be used against
the applicant.” (emphasis omitted)).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
60. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007) (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI
Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation mark omitted)) (noting
that motivation can be found “in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a
person having ordinary skill in the art”).
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61

“combination was obvious to try,” and whether there was a
62
reasonable expectation of success.
Moreover, “secondary
considerations,” such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, [and the] failure of others,” weigh against finding
63
obviousness.
C. Application of the Patentability Requirements to Gene Patents
1. Gene Patents and the Patentable-Subject-Matter Requirement.
One attack on gene-patent validity is that genes are not patentable
64
subject matter because they are products of nature. The Supreme
Court has found products to be patentable when they have “markedly
65
different characteristics from any found in nature.” In other words, a
product produced from natural raw materials must “possess[] a new
66
or distinctive form, quality, or property” to be patentable.
67
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court considered a
patent
for
a
“human-made,
genetically
engineered
bacterium . . . capable of breaking down multiple components of
crude oil,” a property “possessed by no naturally occurring
68
bacteria.” The Court held that the bacterium was patent eligible
because, unlike “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
69
found in the wild,” the bacterium was “not . . . a hitherto unknown
natural phenomenon, but . . . a nonnaturally occurring manufacture
or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a
70
distinctive name, character [and] use.’”

61. Id. at 421.
62. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Obviousness does not
require absolute predictability. Only a reasonable expectation that the beneficial result will be
achieved is necessary to show obviousness.” (citation omitted)).
63. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
64. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 220–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (surveying the legal
precedent and concluding that the DNA in the claim at issue was essentially a product of
nature), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
65. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
66. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
67. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
68. Id. at 305.
69. Id. at 309.
70. Id. at 309–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)). Other cases support the idea that products are patentable when sufficiently
distinguishable from corresponding natural products. See, e.g., In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1175
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding that a substance purified from strawberries to produce strawberry
flavor is patentable subject matter).
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By contrast, in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
the claimed invention, a mixture of root-nodule bacteria that aids
72
plants in fixing nitrogen, was held unpatentable. Though the
discovery was useful because it overcame the mutually inhibitive
73
effects of the bacteria, the Court held that it was not patentable
subject matter because it was “no more than the discovery of some of
74
the handiwork of nature.”
Until 2011, neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit
had directly addressed the issue of whether isolated DNA is
75
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and courts seemed
76
generally to assume that DNA was patentable subject matter. This
assumption was consistent with the long-held position of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office:
An isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence
as a naturally occurring gene is eligible for a patent because (1) an
excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as
an article of manufacture because that DNA molecule does not
occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA
preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is
77
different from the naturally occurring compound.

71. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). The issue in Funk
Bros. might better be viewed as one of obviousness rather than of patentable subject matter. See
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has “cast[] this
case decided on obviousness in terms of § 101”).
72. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 132.
73. Id. at 129–30.
74. Id. at 131 (“No species acquires a different use. The combination of species produces
no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of
their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. . . . They serve the ends nature
originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”). Other cases
support the idea that products are not patentable if they have the same characteristics as
corresponding natural products. See, e.g., Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1,
11–12 (1931) (holding that an orange impregnated with borax to prevent blue-mold decay was
unpatentable because “[t]here [was] no change in the name, appearance, or general character of
the fruit”).
75. See Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has
directly decided the issue of the patentability of isolated DNA molecules.”).
76. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1204, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that a claim to “[a] purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a
DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin” was valid).
77. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (internal
guidelines). The U.S. government’s amicus brief took a position inconsistent with this statement
in the Myriad case, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, but the U.S. Patent and Trademark
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This status quo, however, was called into question by the district
court’s holding in Myriad I that isolated DNA is an unpatentable
product of nature because the unaltered information-encoding
function of DNA is also central to the utility of DNA in its isolated
78
79
form. Although the Federal Circuit reversed this holding on appeal,
80
the case has not been finally resolved by the courts.
2. Gene Patents and the Utility Requirement. Another area in
which courts have strictly construed the patentability requirements to
limit the availability of gene patents is the utility requirement. In
2005, the Federal Circuit addressed the utility requirement for DNA
81
patents in In re Fisher. The claims at issue in Fisher involved purified
nucleic-acid-sequence fragments known as “expressed sequence tags”
82
(ESTs). The claimed ESTs corresponded with fragments of specific
genes, but the patentee knew neither the precise structure nor the
83
functions of those genes. The court first held that the ESTs failed to
satisfy the substantial-utility requirement, noting that they “act as no
more than research intermediates that may help scientists to isolate
the particular underlying . . . genes and conduct further

Office appears to disagree with the brief’s position, see Dan Vorhaus & John Conley, Swine
Soar Higher in Myriad Thanks to US Government’s Amicus Brief, GENOMICS L. REP. (Nov. 1,
2010), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/11/01/swine-soar-higher-in-myriadthanks-to-us-governments-amicus-brief (noting that the brief was contrary to the longstanding
position of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and that the absence of visible support for the
brief from Patent Office lawyers may indicate that the Patent Office opposed its filing,
consistent with its preference for maintaining the status quo).
78. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185, 227–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“DNA’s existence in an
‘isolated’ form alters neither this fundamental quality of DNA as it exists in the body nor the
information it encodes.”), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also infra Part II.A.1.
79. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Although the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court, its rationale for doing so cast doubt on the patentability of other natural
products. See infra notes 192–201 and accompanying text.
80. See Mary Beth Tung, Myriad: Isolated DNA Claims from “Ball Bats in Trees,” and
“Kidneys” to “Magic Microscopes,” IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 25, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://ipwatchdog
.com/2011/09/25/myriad-isolated-dna-claims (“The ACLU requested reconsideration of the
decision by the same panel based on assertions that Judge Lourie’s explanation of covalent
bonds resulting in a distinct DNA molecule was an error because neither side had presented the
argument. The ACLU Petition was denied on September 13, 2011, and Myriad’s Petition was
denied on September 16. Since an en banc rehearing was not requested it has been waived. It
appears that cert. by the Supreme Court is the only option for both parties at this point.”).
81. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
82. Id. at 1367 (“An EST is a short nucleotide sequence that represents a fragment [of the
nucleotide sequence encoding a protein].”).
83. Id. at 1368.
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experimentation on those genes.” The court then held that the ESTs
did not satisfy the specific-utility requirement, as “[a]ny EST
transcribed from any gene . . . has the potential to perform any one of
85
the alleged uses.” Thus, the court concluded that for this type of
DNA sequence to meet the utility standard, it must “correlate to an
86
underlying gene of known function.”
3. Gene Patents and the Obviousness Requirement. Courts have
also been imposing more stringent nonobviousness standards for gene
87
88
patents. For example, the Federal Circuit held in In re Kubin that
the gene patent at issue was obvious because “the prior art [taught
the] protein of interest, a motivation to isolate the gene coding for
89
that protein, and illustrative instructions . . . for cloning this gene.”
Thus, the court appeared to cabin the permissibility of gene patents to
situations in which “the improvement is more than the predictable
90
use of prior art elements according to their established functions.”
Ultimately, these changes in the utility and nonobviousness standards,
as well as the more robust written-description requirement that has
91
developed, have restricted the availability of gene patents.
D. Alleged Problems Created by Gene Patents
Approximately 20 percent of human genes are allegedly
92
patented. This staggering estimate, combined with the restrictive

84. Id. at 1373.
85. Id. at 1374; cf. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (holding that “the nebulous
expressions ‘biological activity’ [and] ‘biological properties’” do not satisfy the utility
requirement).
86. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1374.
87. Nonobviousness became a bigger hurdle when the Supreme Court held in 2007 that the
attribute of being “[o]bvious to try” can demonstrate an invention’s obviousness “[w]hen there
is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of
identified, predictable solutions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (first
alteration in original) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
89. Id. at 1360.
90. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
91. See, e.g., Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 636 F.3d 1341, 1349–53
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying a strengthened written-description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2006) to invalidate patent claims to antibodies).
92. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,
310 SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005) (“[N]early 20% of human genes are explicitly claimed as U.S. IP.
This represents 4382 of the 23,688 of genes in the NCBI’s gene database at the time of
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93

licensing that often accompanies gene patents, has caused concern.
94
Aside from general uneasiness about patenting human DNA,
concerns exist about hindering access to medical treatments,
diminishing the quality of patient care, and stifling research and
95
innovation. Although some of these concerns may be warranted, the
96
data cited in their support are far from clear, and patents may not be
97
the primary underlying problem.
1. Diminishing Patient Access. One concern about gene patents
is that they may hinder timely, equitable access to medical treatments
98
or tests. The limited monopolies granted by gene patents, combined
with exclusive licensing, create a lack of competition that has the
potential to hinder access to products falling within the scope of the
99
patents. The example of genetic diagnostic tests is illustrative.
Gene patents limit the number of providers of genetic diagnostic
100
tests. Clinical laboratories that are capable of offering particular
tests may be forced to stop offering or developing those tests because
101
of patents. In the rare circumstance in which a patent holder

writing . . . .”). But see Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Impede Whole Genome
Sequencing?: Deconstructing the Myth That 20% of the Human Genome Is Patented 2, 13 (July
25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894715 (noting that
Professor Fiona Murray and then-doctoral candidate Kyle Jensen examined whether genes were
mentioned in patent claims rather than whether they were actually claimed and further noting
that many of the patents in their study have since expired).
93. See Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413, 18,415
(Apr. 11, 2005) (notice) (responding to purportedly restrictive licensing practices by suggesting
a more limited use of exclusive licensing with genomic inventions).
94. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
95. See generally SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note
1 (examining the effects of gene patents on access to genetic testing and research and
innovation).
96. See infra Part I.D.1–3.
97. For example, health-insurance issues are a major underlying factor. See infra notes 103–
04 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
99. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 38–39
(discussing a case study suggesting that patents and exclusive licenses can result in higher prices
for some genetic tests).
100. See id. at 39 (finding that “the patenting and licensing of genetic tests has limited the
ability of clinical laboratories to offer genetic testing”).
101. See Mildred K. Cho, Samantha Illangasekare, Meredith A. Weaver, Debra G.B.
Leonard & Jon F. Merz, Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic
Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 3 (2003) (surveying clinical-laboratory
directors and finding that 25 percent had stopped performing clinical genetic tests and 53
percent had decided not to develop new clinical genetic tests because of patents or licenses).
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enforces its patent without filling the resulting void, patient access can
102
be negatively affected.
Increased costs may also diminish patient access. This is
particularly the case when increased costs are borne directly by
patients, such as when the sole test provider does not accept a
103
particular type of insurance or when a patient’s insurance does not
104
cover the test. Patients and insurance providers might also directly
shoulder the burden of increased costs if the costs of obtaining a
particular test increase due to the lack of competition created by the
105
presence of a sole test provider. This latter concern, however, may
be exaggerated. For example, prices for genetic tests based on
exclusively licensed patents are often similar to prices for tests based
106
on nonexclusively licensed patents.

102. E.g., Misha Angrist, Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Christopher Heaney & Robert
Cook-Deegan, Impact of Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Long
QT Syndrome, 12 GENETICS MED. S111, S111 (2010) (finding that the enforcement of gene
patents before the development of a commercial test led at least one of two previous providers
of genetic testing for long QT syndrome (LQTS) to cease testing, a decision that “probably had
a small but tangible negative effect on patient access to genetic testing for LQTS between 2002
and 2004”). Nevertheless, restrictions on who can offer a genetic diagnostic test do not
necessarily lead to decreased patient accessibility. See Christopher M. Holman, Gene Patents
Under Fire: Weighing the Costs and Benefits 22 (Nov. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710150 (discussing how Myriad, as a sole provider, had
more incentive to invest “substantially in facilitating insurance reimbursement and in promoting
awareness of BRCA testing,” which would likely result in increased accessibility).
103. E.g., Ordering & Billing, ATHENA DIAGNOSTICS, http://www.athenadiagnostics.com/
content/ordering (last visited Nov. 9, 2011) (“Athena Diagnostics is not a participating provider
in any Medicaid program . . . .”). But see Matt Jones, Myriad, ACLU Case Hits Higher Court,
GENOMEWEB (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/myriad-aclu-case-hits-highercourt (“[Myriad] . . . said that insurance currently covers 90 percent of BRCA testing and that
an average co-pay for the test is approximately $100. [Myriad] also said it provides financial
assistance programs for patients who are uninsured or have high deductibles or limited
incomes.”).
104. Karen P. Mann, Gene Patents: Perspectives from the Clinical Laboratory, 14
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 137, 139 (2010) (providing an example of a case in which
insurance did not cover testing for Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, leaving the patient with a
$10,000 bill).
105. See Angrist et al., supra note 102, at S113 (finding that “a competitive presence could
have accelerated the [LQTS] test to market and lowered the cost”).
106. See Robert Cook-Deegan, Christopher DeRienzo, Julia Carbone, Subhashini
Chandrasekharan, Christopher Heaney & Christopher Conover, Impact of Gene Patents and
Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer:
Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS MED. S15, S15
(2010) (finding that “[p]rices for BRCA1 and 2 testing do not reflect an obvious price premium
attributable to exclusive patent rights compared with colorectal cancer testing,” for which the
relevant patents are nonexclusively licensed).
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Alternatively, clinical laboratories may bear the increased costs
and then pass them along to patients and insurance providers. For
example, costs could increase when a laboratory is forced to send
107
multiple samples to different sole test providers. Similarly, a
laboratory’s expenses related to staying informed about which genes
are patented, which are licensed, and how they are licensed could
108
increase costs.
2. Diminishing Quality of Patient Care. Another concern is that
the allowance of gene patents may cause the quality of medical
109
treatments to diminish. Again, this phenomenon is illustrated by the
example of genetic diagnostic tests.
When only one test provider exists, second opinions are not
110
available, even to confirm an ambiguous result. This fact is
particularly concerning because major medical decisions—such as
whether to have a mastectomy—can hinge on the interpretation of
111
genetic test results.
Product quality and reliability may also decrease if gene patents
prevent competitors from providing comparative standards. A
principal method of assessing the performance of genetic diagnostic
tests is comparison among several test providers. Because different
providers develop different methods and technologies, the
comparison and subsequent improvement of tests ultimately allows
112
providers to increase sensitivity, specificity, and reproducibility.
Thus, without any competing peers to provide the incentive to
improve available genetic diagnostic tests, optimal performance may
113
not be achieved. Without gene patents, however, some current

107. Mann, supra note 104, at 139.
108. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 41; see
also Mann, supra note 104, at 138 (discussing the challenges of determining the patent and
licensing landscape).
109. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 46–48.
110. Mann, supra note 104, at 139. Although confirmatory tests could be performed by the
sole test provider, this arrangement is not as desirable, particularly if that sole provider has a
deficiency in its test.
111. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 44; see
also infra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
112. Mann, supra note 104, at 139.
113. See, e.g., Steve Benowitz, French Challenge to BRCA1 Patent Underlies European
Discontent, 94 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 80, 80–81 (2002) (noting that geneticist Dr. Dominique
Stoppa-Lyonnet claimed that Myriad’s test “misse[d] some 10% to 20% of the expected
BRCA1 mutations”).
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genetic diagnostic tests may have never been developed and, even if
they had been developed, they likely would not have been as
114
extensively marketed and used.
Gene patenting may also cause healthcare to become more
fragmented and inefficient. Exclusivity prevents all the tests that a
patient needs from being provided in one central location. Requiring
patient samples to be sent to multiple locations for testing increases
115
turnaround time and makes interpreting test results more difficult
because tests obtained from several different locations must be
116
interpreted together as a relevant group.
Moreover, sending
samples to multiple test providers increases the risk of having
insufficient samples, and additional sample collection may not be
117
feasible if treatment has already started.
3. Impeding Research and Innovation. The final alleged problem
created by gene patents is interference with research and
118
innovation. The primary concern in this area is the theory of the
“anticommons effect,” which posits that “a resource is prone to
underuse . . . when multiple owners each have a right to exclude
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of
119
use.” According to this theory, the large number of gene patents
120
and gene-patent owners will create a “patent thicket” that will stifle
121
The argument is that by “draw[ing] no
further innovation.
distinction between downstream inventions that lead directly to
commercial products and fundamental research discoveries that

114. See Holman, supra note 102, at 22 (discussing how Myriad, as a sole provider, had more
incentive to invest “substantially in facilitating insurance reimbursement and in promoting
awareness of BRCA testing,” which would likely result in increased accessibility); infra notes
184–86 and accompanying text.
115. Mann, supra note 104, at 138.
116. Id. at 138–39.
117. Id. at 138.
118. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
119. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
120. See Jensen & Murray, supra note 92, at 239 (finding that “[t]he 4270 [gene] patents
[that existed at the time were] owned by 1156 different assignees”).
121. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (2000) (describing how a “patent
thicket” can stifle innovation because it is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new
technology”).
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broadly enable further scientific investigation,” research and
122
innovation will be hindered.
In general, however, the empirical data regarding the effects of
biotechnology patents on research and innovation are equivocal or
123
show insubstantial effects. Although inhibitory effects have been
documented in the context of clinical laboratories providing genetic
124
diagnostic tests —a context in which laboratories are presumably
engaged not just in research and innovation, but also in competition
with the patent holders—the available data generally fail to
demonstrate the effects that would be expected to attend a classic
125
anticommons problem. For example, in a survey of 381 academic
scientists, only 1 percent reported experiencing modifications or
delays due to the existence of third-party patents, and none of the
126
scientists reported being stopped by such patents. This effect may
122. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289–91 (2003) (explaining how allowing
universities to patent foundational biomedical discoveries may hinder the private innovation
that the patent system was designed to encourage).
123. See John M. Conley, Gene Patents and the Product of Nature Doctrine, 84 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 109, 131 (2009) (“The empirical evidence for the effect of biotechnology patents on
research is mixed.”); Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 2, at 414 (“There has been no conclusive
empirical study to support one or the other viewpoint.”).
124. See Timothy Caulfield, Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006) (noting that, generally, “the
effects predicted by the anticommons problem are not borne out in the available data,” but
recognizing that “[o]ne important exception is in the area of gene patents that cover a diagnostic
test”); supra note 101 and accompanying text.
125. Caulfield, supra note 124, at 1092; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen,
View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002–03 (2005) (finding
“little empirical basis for claims that restricted access to IP is currently impeding biomedical
research”); see also Christie Rizk, The Big Fight, GENOMEWEB (July 1, 2011), http://www.
genomeweb.com/big-fight (drawing attention to the infringing research permitted by Myriad
that has led to thousands of articles on Myriad’s patented genes and suggesting that if an
infringing researcher were to find an important, novel mutation, “not only would [Myriad] not
enforce the patent, it would most likely pay for the research”). Available gene-patent-litigation
data also suggest that no anticommons problem exists. See Christopher M. Holman, Trends in
Human Gene Patent Litigation, 322 SCIENCE 198, 198–99 (2008) (“Human gene patent litigation
invariably has involved an alleged infringer engaged in substantial commercial activities focused
specifically on the single gene that is the subject of the asserted patent, the antithesis of a patent
thicket scenario.”). But see Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights
Hinder Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis,
63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648, 648 (2007) (finding a modest anticommons effect in a study of
patent-paper pairs and the effect of issuance of a patent on the citation rate to the
corresponding paper).
126. Walsh, supra note 125, at 2002. Even if researchers were forced to change course
because of patents, that result might not necessarily decrease social welfare. See John P. Walsh,
Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual
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be so minimal because researchers often ignore third-party patents
and because patent holders typically choose not to enforce their
128
patents against infringing researchers. Thus, although it is unclear
what effect gene patents have on research and innovation, the
situation is not nearly as grim as predicted by the theory of the
anticommons.
II. CRITIQUE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The perceived problems caused by gene patents have triggered
129
numerous passionate responses. Among those responses are two
noteworthy developments: Myriad I and the SACGHS report on gene
patents, neither of which properly addressed the competing concerns
implicated by gene patents. The Myriad I holding would have caused
unintended, far-reaching consequences because it was based on an
improper application of the law and ignored important policy
130
considerations.
Similarly, the SACGHS recommendations for
infringement exemptions are hasty, overly broad, and unwise given
the uncertainty in the regulatory framework for genetic diagnostic
131
tests.
A. Critique of the Myriad Case
The progression of the Myriad case has resulted in several
proposed frameworks for the patentability of DNA, ranging from the
Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES. POL’Y 1184, 1200 (2007) (“[I]f such
redirection reduces duplicative research, the social welfare loss may be minimal. There may
even be a net welfare gain if redirection increases the variety of projects pursued.” (citations
omitted)).
127. See Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D. Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implications
of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36, 39
(2009) (remarking that academic agricultural-biology “[s]cientists by and large pay no attention
to the patent status of their research tools because they rightly view themselves as judgmentproof due to their lack of personal resources”).
128. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking
the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2008) (“With patents,
the burden of inertia is on the property owner to identify infringers and to enforce the patent
against them. When owners face high costs of detection and enforcement, it is unlikely that they
will bother to pursue claims of relatively low value (such as claims against noncommercial
academic researchers).” (footnote omitted)); supra note 125.
129. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. For a study on the negative media response
to the Myriad case, see Timothy Caulfield, Tania Bubela & C.J. Murdoch, Myriad and the Mass
Media: The Covering of a Gene Patent Controversy, 9 GENETICS MED. 850 (2007).
130. See infra Part II.A.2.
131. See infra Part II.B.
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holding in Myriad I that isolated DNA is unpatentable subject
132
matter to its reversal on appeal in Myriad II based on the reasoning
133
that isolated DNA has a distinctive chemical structure. None of
these frameworks, however, are ideal.
1. Progression of the Case and Its Various Proposed Frameworks
for DNA Patentability. The Myriad case has had several twists and
turns. In April 2010, Judge Robert Sweet from the Southern District
of New York dropped a bombshell in Myriad I, holding in part that
134
isolated human genes were unpatentable subject matter. The DNA
sequences at issue in the case were the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,
the mutations of which correlate with increased risks of developing
135
breast cancer and ovarian cancer.
Interpreting the patentable-subject-matter standard to require
that an invention must be markedly different from a product of
nature to be patentable, the district court concluded that isolated
DNA is not markedly different from native DNA because of the dual
nature of DNA: it is not only a chemical molecule but also a carrier of
136
information. The court noted that through this information-carrying
capacity, DNA “serves as the physical embodiment of laws of
nature,” and that because this capacity is what also gives isolated
DNA its utility, isolated DNA sequences are “unpatentable products
137
of nature.”
Ultimately, the court’s rationale was that the
“purification of native DNA does not alter its essential
characteristic—its nucleotide sequence—that is defined by nature and
central to both its biological function within the cell and its utility as a
138
research tool in the lab.”
When the appeal reached the Federal Circuit, the U.S.
government took a seemingly less extreme position in its amicus brief
by drawing a distinction between isolated genomic DNA and

132. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
133. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
134. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227–32.
135. Id. at 203 (“Women with [BRCA1] and BRCA2 mutations face up to an 85%
cumulative risk of breast cancer, as well as up to a 50% cumulative risk of ovarian cancer.”).
136. Id. at 228.
137. Id. at 228–29.
138. Id. at 231.
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139

Understanding this distinction
complementary DNA (cDNA).
requires an understanding of the process underlying the conversion of
genes to the proteins they encode. Within genomic DNA, most genes
consist of coding sequences called exons—which provide the
blueprint for the protein encoded by the gene—and noncoding
sequences called introns—which are not necessary for the creation of
140
the protein.
Although both exons and introns are initially
transcribed into RNA, introns are removed from the RNA before it is
141
translated into the end-product protein. This processed version of
the RNA can be used as a template to artificially create cDNA—a
non-naturally occurring form and sequence of DNA that contains the
142
exons of a gene but not the noncoding introns. Because of this
distinction, the government reasoned that genomic DNA is a product
143
of nature, whether isolated or not, whereas cDNA is a human-made
144
invention. The government thus concluded that cDNA should be
145
patentable, whereas isolated genomic DNA should not.
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected both Myriad I’s holding
and the position taken by the U.S. government in its amicus brief. It
instead held that isolated DNA is patentable subject matter
“[b]ecause isolated DNAs, not just cDNAs, have a markedly different
146
chemical structure compared to native DNAs.”
The court
emphasized that isolated DNA can be generated only by synthesizing
it in a laboratory or by chemically cleaving a piece of genomic DNA
147
from the chromosome on which it naturally resides. Neither process
is mere purification; both create a new molecule with “a distinctive
148
chemical identity.”

139. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 7,
at 37.
140. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at 347.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 544 (explaining that genes usually consist of coding and noncoding sequences
and claiming that the most important advantage of cDNA is that it instead consists of an
uninterrupted coding sequence).
143. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 7,
at 17–27.
144. Id. at 14–17.
145. Id. at 37.
146. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
147. Id. at 1351–52.
148. Id. at 1352.
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2. Analysis of Myriad’s Various Proposed Frameworks for DNA
Patentability. The three positions that arose during the Myriad case—
the Myriad I holding, the U.S. government’s position, and the Myriad
II holding—all have flaws or raise important unanswered questions.
The court’s holding in Myriad I—that isolated DNA is
unpatentable because it is most importantly a carrier of
149
information —ignored important ways in which isolated DNA is
150
markedly different from native DNA in both structure and utility.
Native DNA within a cell exists in the form of chromosomes, which
are “enormously long linear DNA molecule[s] associated with
proteins that fold and pack the fine DNA thread into a more compact
151
structure.” Within these chromosomes are linear arrangements of
genes surrounded by a much greater amount of non-gene-encoding
152
DNA. Isolated DNA differs from genomic DNA in that it is free
from surrounding chromosomal proteins and is not covalently bonded
to surrounding chromosomal DNA, thereby representing a new
153
molecule with “a distinctive chemical identity.” The structural
differences between cDNA and native genomic DNA are even
greater. Unlike isolated genomic DNA, cDNA has a unique, non154
naturally occurring DNA sequence.
These structural differences, created through human
155
intervention, cause an “enlargement of the range of . . . utility” for
isolated DNA, as compared to the range of utility for native DNA.
Gene-based diagnostic and therapeutic applications, for example,

149. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
150. The majority opinion in Myriad II stated that arguments regarding utility were not
appropriate for patentable-subject-matter inquiries. See Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1353 (“[I]t is the
distinctive nature of DNA molecules as isolated compositions of matter that determines their
patent eligibility rather than their physiological use or benefit.”). Judge Moore’s concurring
opinion used enlargement in the range of utility as evidence in the patentable-subject-matter
inquiry. Id. at 1363–67 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
151. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at 202 (“The complex of DNA and protein is called
chromatin . . . . In addition to the proteins involved in packaging the DNA, chromosomes are
also associated with many proteins and RNA molecules required for the processes of gene
expression, DNA replication, and DNA repair.” (emphasis omitted)).
152. Id. at 218.
153. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1351; accord id. at 1361–63 (Moore, J., concurring in part)
(providing details on the different physical and chemical characteristics of isolated DNA).
154. Id. at 1364 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Although cDNA sequences do occur
naturally in RNA, “DNA has a different chemical structure than RNA, including a different
base . . . and sugar units.” Id.
155. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
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often require use of shorter, isolated DNA sequences. Moreover,
isolated genes can be separated from their regulatory sequences,
“which are responsible for ensuring that the gene is turned on or off
at the proper time, expressed at the appropriate level, and only in the
157
proper type of cell.” By separating a gene from its regulatory
sequences, researchers can combine the isolated gene with new
158
regulatory sequences, thereby allowing manipulation of when,
159
where, and at what level the gene is expressed. The ability to
manipulate gene expression in this manner facilitates the use of
160
and gene
isolated DNA for recombinant-protein therapeutics
161
therapy.
There are even more advantages to using the uninterrupted
coding sequence of cDNA instead of isolated genomic DNA. For
example, neither bacterial nor yeast cells will remove introns from
RNA produced by a human gene that has been introduced into those
162
cells. This fact is important because bacteria and yeast have
characteristics that make the production of recombinant proteins in

156. For example, diagnostic tests are often “based on the sequence-specific binding of short
complementary DNA probes . . . to DNA samples from patients in order to detect mutations.”
W. Gregory Feero, Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Genomic Medicine—An Updated
Primer, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2001, 2006 (2010).
157. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at 206.
158. See supra note 32.
159. See, e.g., Carolina Roa-Rodríguez, Promoters Used To Regulate Gene Expression,
PATENT LENS, 2–3 (Apr. 11, 2007, 4:10 PM), http://www.cambia.org/daisy/promoters/3141/
version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/patentlens_techlandscape_promoters.pdf (describing
different types of regulatory DNA sequences called promoters and discussing how they can be
used to control the expression of a gene).
160. In the production of recombinant-protein therapeutics, regulatory sequences that drive
high amounts of expression of the isolated gene are desired. See Wurm, supra note 29, at 1393
(explaining how, once the vectors containing the isolated gene are transferred into cells,
“individual clones are evaluated for recombinant protein expression, with the highest producers
being retained for further cultivation and analysis”). Moreover, the ability to splice the isolated
gene together with DNA encoding selectable markers enables the selection of cells expressing
the highest levels of a recombinant gene. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 12, at 514 (noting the
utility of attaching special recognition tags to DNA).
161. For example, it is often desirable in gene therapy to use tissue-specific promoters to
direct expression of the gene to a particular type of tissue within the body. See, e.g., B. Wang, J.
Li, F.H. Fu, C. Chen, X. Zhu, L. Zhou, X. Jiang & X. Xiao, Construction and Analysis of
Compact Muscle-Specific Promoters for AAV Vectors, 15 GENE THERAPY 1489, 1489 (2008)
(noting that, in the context of gene therapy for muscular dystrophy, “the use of muscle-specific
promoters is highly desirable” because nonspecific promoters that cause “widespread targeted
gene expression” can “result in overall toxicity and/or the initiation of a host immune response
against tissues expressing the transgene or gene vector”).
162. Id.
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163

bulk technically feasible. Consequently, they are often used to
164
produce recombinant-protein therapeutics from isolated DNA.
As these examples demonstrate, although the informationbearing capacity of DNA is one characteristic that enables isolated
DNA to be used in genetic diagnostic tests and biologic drugs, it is not
the sole important characteristic. Other characteristics that are not
present in native DNA are equally important; whether it is cDNA
without intron sequences or simply DNA separated from other
chromosomal DNA and proteins, isolated DNA has been materially
changed through human intervention, not so that it is more effective
than native DNA, but so that it can be used for applications for which
165
native DNA cannot. Thus, isolated DNA is unlike the claimed
invention in Funk Brothers, which consisted merely of a mixture of
naturally-occurring bacteria performing the same functions they
166
performed in nature. Rather, like the bacteria in Chakrabarty—
which, although still bacteria, had been altered to enable their use in
167
breaking down crude oil —isolated DNA is still DNA, but it has
been altered through human intervention to enable its use in
therapeutics and diagnostics. Isolated DNA is, therefore, a
“nonnaturally
occurring
manufacture
or
composition
of
168
matter . . . ‘having a distinctive . . . character [and] use,’” and should
be patentable subject matter.
This conclusion is consistent with Congress’s intent that
patentable subject matter be construed broadly enough to “include
169
anything under the sun that is made by man.” Likewise, the
Supreme Court has recognized only narrow exceptions to patent-

163. Neus Ferrer-Miralles, Joan Domingo-Espín, José Luis Corchero, Esther Vázquez &
Antonio Villaverde, Microbial Factories for Recombinant Pharmaceuticals, MICROBIAL CELL
FACTORIES, Mar. 24, 2009, at 1, 3.
164. See id. at 2 (“Among the 151 protein-based recombinant pharmaceuticals licensed up to
January 2009 by the FDA and EMEA, 45 (29.8%) are obtained in [bacteria], 28 (18.5%) in
[yeast], . . . and 59 (39%) in mammalian cells.”). But see Wurm, supra note 29, at 1393 (“Today
about 60–70% of all recombinant protein pharmaceuticals are produced in mammalian cells.”).
165. See supra notes 150–64 and accompanying text.
166. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (“Each of the
species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous
plants which it always infected. No species acquires a different use.”).
167. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
168. Id. at 309–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)).
169. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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eligible subject matter—“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
170
abstract ideas” —because “[t]he § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is
171
only a threshold test.” To hold that something is not patent eligible
because it is a product of nature creates a slippery slope, for “[n]early
172
everything . . . directly or tangentially involves a product of nature.”
As such, the utility, novelty, obviousness, and written-description
requirements “provide finer, more appropriate filters for separating
truly inventive additions to human knowledge from unpatentable
173
matter.”
Policy factors also weigh in favor of upholding the patentability
of isolated DNA. It is generally not disputed that the biotechnology
174
industry is particularly dependent on patent protection. The reason
for this dependence is that the development of therapeutics in the
175
biotechnology industry is a lengthy, costly, and risky endeavor. The
average time required to bring a therapeutic to market—including
drug discovery, preclinical testing, clinical trials, and Food and Drug
176
Administration (FDA) review—is fifteen years. In addition to being
time-intensive, the process is also accompanied by high expenses,
177
with various estimates ranging from $500 million to $2 billion. For
170. Id.
171. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
172. Brief of Amici Curiae Rosetta Genomics, Ltd. et al. in Support of DefendantsAppellants, Supporting Reversal at 33, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 20101406); see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 135 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Everything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature,’
and any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties ‘the laws of nature.’ Arguments
drawn from such terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to challenge
almost every patent.”).
173. Brief for the Appellants at 50, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406). Importantly,
the patentability requirements of §§ 102, 103, and 112 are being applied more stringently. See
supra Part I.C.2–3.
174. See, e.g., Robert J. Paradiso & Lisa K. Schroeder, District Court Holds Myriad’s Gene
Patents Invalid, 18 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 25, 25 (2010) (“Because the development of
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals can be time intensive, unpredictable, and expensive, life
sciences innovators need the mechanisms provided by the patent system to recoup their
investments and ensure a steady revenue stream for further research and development.”).
175. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
176. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS
HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 6 (2006).
177. See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (“[F]or one large
pharmaceutical firm, the expected cost of developing a drug is $521 million, while for another
large firm, it is $2,119 million.”); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of
Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 475
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drugs derived from biological products like DNA, the costs tend to be
178
even higher. These costs result not only from the extensive
development process but also from the unpredictability inherent in
biological innovation: for every compound that is brought to market
179
as a drug, there are approximately ten-thousand failed attempts. As
a consequence, costs include both “the research and development
that led to the product” and “the scores of failed experiments that did
not result in a commercial product but may have ultimately led to the
180
patented invention.”
Commentators have argued that patents are not always necessary
to stimulate biotechnology researchers to invent because they have
many other incentives, particularly when it comes to identifying genes
181
associated with different diseases. This argument is premised on the
fact that “[n]early all disease genes are identified not by private
182
industry, but by researchers working at non-profit institutions.” As
such, those academic or nonprofit researchers might be driven by a
desire to help patients or to advance understanding, a desire to
enhance their reputations by receiving credit for priority of discovery,
or a desire to enhance their careers by being able to secure research
funding based on past scientific achievement and to compete more
183
effectively for faculty positions and other jobs.

(2007) (finding that the “[t]otal capitalized cost per approved molecule for biopharmaceuticals
is . . . $1241 million” in 2005 dollars); Steven M. Paul, Daniel S. Mytelka, Christopher T.
Dunwiddie, Charles C. Persinger, Bernard H. Munos, Stacy R. Lindborg & Aaron L. Schacht,
How To Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 9
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 204 (2010) (“[T]he average cost for
[pharmaceutical] companies to bring [a new molecular entity] to market is now estimated to be
approximately $1.8 billion.”).
178. Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 482 (2008)
(“Biologics also have higher discovery and preclinical expenditures and longer mean clinical
development times. It was also found that the development of biologics involve [sic] higher
development costs associated with process engineering and manufacturing than is true for
chemical drugs. This reflects the need to resolve novel manufacturing challenges at the R&D
stage.”). Biologics are essentially “complex molecules produced from cultures of living cells.”
Id. at 481.
179. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176, at 1.
180. Larry A. Roberts, Myriad: How Did Public Policy Weigh In?, INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, May 2010, at 1, 5.
181. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 20
(noting researchers’ desire to advance understanding and help patients).
182. Id. at 22.
183. Id. at 20–22.
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This argument, however, ignores a more important function of
the patent system in the context of biotechnology and gene patents:
providing the incentive to invest in the development and
commercialization of biotechnology and gene-patent-derived
184
inventions. The premise underlying this theory is that, in some
contexts, “the patent system is not so much needed to stimulate
inventive activity; rather, it facilitates investment into costly and risky
development processes that are necessary to transform a ‘mere’
185
invention into a marketable product.” The development of the
genetic diagnostic tests at issue in Myriad reflects this theory: “While
university scientists received substantial grants from the National
Institutes of Health, Myriad was largely financed by private venture
186
These private capital
capital totaling at least $22 [million].”
investments are often required for small biotechnology companies to
survive because these companies generally have considerable
research and development expenses but may not yet have a
187
marketable product. Without patents, the ability to attract this
188
necessary private investment would be greatly diminished and many
189
biotechnology companies would no longer survive. This effect in

184. See Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra note 10, at 372 (“The ‘incentive to invest’
theory focuses on a patent’s function to induce investment for the development and
commercialization of inventions.”). See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (discussing the “prospect” function of patents).
For example, from 1994 to 2005, Myriad lost money because it “spent $500 million not just on
research and development of its BRACAnalysis test, but also on educating patients, marketing
the test, educating physicians as to its use and necessity, and working with insurance companies
to cover the cost of testing.” Rizk, supra note 125.
185. Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra note 10, at 372. In the biotechnology industry,
this function is particularly important because “a patent on a promising compound or
technology can attract capital for product development.” Id.
186. Roberts, supra note 180, at 5.
187. See, e.g., Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Sapna Kumar, Cory M. Valley & Arti Rai,
Proprietary Science, Open Science, and the Role of Patent Disclosure: The Case of Zinc-Finger
Proteins, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 140, 141 (2009) (discussing the example of Sangamo
Biosciences and noting that “a dominant patent position facilitates Sangamo’s ability to attract
private capital,” which is necessary “[g]iven Sangamo’s considerable R&D expenses and lack of
marketable products”).
188. See Roberts, supra note 180, at 5 (“[I]f a patent applicant cannot enjoy its period of
exclusivity to recoup its R&D costs and make a profit for its investors, from where will future
financing of biotechnology come?”).
189. See Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 23
HEALTH AFF. 10, 15 (2004) (“Without patent rights in inventions in areas such as isolation and
purification of proteins, DNA sequences, monoclonal antibodies, knockout and transgenic
organisms, gene expression systems, and so on (or at least the prospect of obtaining and
enforcing them), many biotech companies would never have been founded.”). One example of a
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turn could lead to stagnation in product development because small
biotechnology companies play an important role in bridging the gap
between basic scientific discoveries and the development of
190
marketable products based on those discoveries; in essence, they
serve a critical role as “specialist suppliers of leading-edge technology
to downstream firms” that have the resources to bring that
191
technology to market.
Unintended consequences could also result from the more
moderate position of the U.S. government that cDNA is patentable
because “such molecules do not occur in nature, either in isolation or
as contiguous sequences contained within longer natural molecules,”
whereas genomic DNA is unpatentable because it does occur in
192
nature in such forms. For example, it is unclear how other natural
products such as proteins would continue to be patentable: unlike
193
cDNAs, proteins exist in nature. Similarly, although Myriad II is the
most gene-patent friendly of the frameworks for DNA patentability
considered in Myriad, it also appears to cast some doubt on the
patentability of other natural products by emphasizing that isolated
DNA is patentable because it is “manipulated chemically” to create a
“distinct chemical entity” and is, therefore, more than simply
194
“purified DNA.”
One example of a situation in which these positions could have
detrimental effects is antibiotic development. Some commentators
drug that has needed to rely on gene-patent protection is Epogen—recombinant erythropoietin.
Holman, supra note 102, at 23.
190. See Cockburn, supra note 189. This critical gap has been called the “valley of death.”
See Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman, Pathways Across the
Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008) (“[O]ne of the most serious pitfalls involves the
difficulty of moving across the so-called ‘valley of death’ that separates upstream research on
promising genes, proteins, and biological pathways from downstream drug candidates.”).
Especially in the case of biological macromolecules, small biotechnology companies have had
success in bridging this gap. Id. at 5 n.12.
191. Cockburn, supra note 189, at 15.
192. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 7,
at 15.
193. See supra Part I.A.1.
194. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Christopher M. Holman, AMP
v. PTO Casts Doubt on Patent Eligibility of “Purified” (as Opposed to “Isolated”) Biomolecules,
HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011, 9:51 AM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot
.com/2011/08/amp-v-pto-casts-doubt-on-patent.html (“[I]t seems that . . . [the Federal Circuit’s]
decision suggests that a purified natural product is patent ineligible unless it has distinctions in
chemical structure sufficient to render it ‘markedly different’ from its naturally occurring
counterpart.” (quoting Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1352)).
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have expressed concern that at the same time resistance to antibiotics
195
is increasing, development of new antibiotics is decreasing. Part of
the reason underlying this decrease is that antibiotic development has
become a low priority for biotechnology companies due to the
196
relatively low return on their investment. Given this reality, the
protection and incentives provided by patents could be critical for the
197
development of new antibiotics. There are two general pathways to
develop antibiotics: “isolation of natural products with antibiotic
198
activity and preparation of synthetic antibiotics.” The former
pathway, “the discovery of natural product antibiotics from bacterial
199
sources,” has been the subject of increasing interest. This method of
development, however, could be hampered by the U.S. government’s
position, and perhaps by the court’s rationale in Myriad II, because it
is unclear how or whether natural-product antibiotics would continue
200
to be patentable. This potential deterrent could exacerbate the
201
existing lack of incentive to develop antibiotics.
In summary, the holding of Myriad I and the position taken by
the U.S. government in its amicus brief both fail to consider
adequately the investment-backed expectations of the biotechnology
202
industry and the fact that there are “many drugs currently on the

195. See generally Martin L. Katz, Lisa V. Mueller, Mark Polyakov & Steven F. Weinstock,
Where Have All the Antibiotic Patents Gone?, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1529 (2006)
(discussing the slowdown in antibiotic development and noting that it is crucial to continue
developing new antibiotics in light of increasing antibiotic resistance).
196. See id. at 1530 (comparing the return on investment from antibiotic drugs with the
return on investment from nonantibiotic drugs).
197. See id. at 1531 (suggesting that two incentives that could be provided to companies
engaged in antibiotic research are “extending market exclusivity for antibiotics (especially when
second uses are discovered) and providing longer patent term extensions to compensate for
longer and costlier developments of antibiotics as compared to chronically used drugs”).
198. Jon Clardy, Michael A. Fischbach & Christopher T. Walsh, New Antibiotics from
Bacterial Natural Products, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1541, 1541 (2006).
199. Id.
200. It should be noted that “virtually every newly discovered antibiotic since 1929 has been
patented,” including “erythromycin, vancomycin, rifamycin, clarithromycin, ciprofloxacin and
azithromycin.” Katz, supra note 195, at 1529.
201. Narrower patents, such as patents directed to uses of the newly discovered antibiotics,
could still be obtained. Process patents, however, are not as desirable as product patents on the
DNA or protein. Some of the disadvantages include “(1) the difficulty of detecting
infringement[ and] (2) the defects in infringement doctrines.” MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 58,
at 388–91.
202. See Brief of Amici Curiae Rosetta Genomics, Ltd. et al. in Support of DefendantsAppellants, Supporting Reversal, supra note 172, at 29 (“[A]n adverse decision here could
negatively impact thousands of existing patents. For example, a search conducted on September
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market that simply would not exist without such patents” and the
203
incentives they provide. Although the Federal Circuit corrected
these problems temporarily in Myriad II, its rationale unfortunately
204
cast doubt on the patentability of other natural products. And, no
matter how the Federal Circuit’s rationale and holding are ultimately
205
interpreted, the case has yet to be finally resolved by the courts.
B. Critique of the SACGHS Report on Gene Patents and Licensing
Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic
Diagnostic Tests
Another proposed solution to the alleged problems created by
gene patents is a 2010 SACGHS report that recommends two
statutory changes: (1) “an exemption from liability for anyone who
infringes a patent on a gene while making, using, ordering, offering
206
for sale, or selling a genetic test for patient care purposes” and
(2) “an exemption from patent infringement liability for those who
207
use patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.” Although
these proposed exemptions attempt to address the perceived
problems created by gene patents, their broad language threatens to
undermine the entire gene-patent system. As one commentator notes,
“Patient care and research are broad, nebulous categories that, if
interpreted generously, could cover every reasonably likely use for
208
many patent-protected genes and related tests.” Additionally, as
this Section demonstrates, because of the faulty reasoning behind the
SACGHS recommendations, the proposed statutory exemptions are
both unwise and difficult to define.
1. Exemption for Patient-Care Purposes. In suggesting the
creation of a patient-care exemption, the SACGHS relies on its belief
that gene “patents do not appear to be necessary to stimulate
22, 2010, on the USPTO website for U.S. issued patents filed within the last 17 years . . . having
claims [directed to isolated or purified nucleic acids] brought up 23,710 patents alone.”).
203. Gregory C. Ellis, Emerging Biotechnologies Demand Defeat of Proposed Legislation
That Attempts To Ban Gene Patents, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2008, at 1, 24–25, http://jolt.
richmond.edu/v15i1/article1.pdf; see also supra notes 22–36 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 192–201 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 80.
206. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 94.
207. Id. at 95.
208. Dan Vorhaus, SACGHS Gene Patent Recommendations Still Controversial, GENOMICS
L. REP. (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/02/08/sacghs-genepatent-recommendations-still-controversial.
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research and genetic test development,” in part because
209
“development costs are minimal” for genetic diagnostic tests.
Though existing development costs may be minimal for some types of
tests, those costs may change because the FDA has taken steps to
210
increase regulation of diagnostic tests.
There are currently two main categories of genetic diagnostic
tests: test kits—or in vitro diagnostic tests—and laboratory-developed
211
tests (LDTs). The first category, test kits, can be manufactured for
212
distribution in interstate commerce and are regulated as medical
devices by the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
213
Act. To ensure safety and efficacy, the FDA takes a data-driven
approach and requires test-kit manufacturers to “provide data
supporting any analytical and clinical claims related to the use and/or
214
effectiveness of a product.” LDTs, on the other hand, can be used
215
only in the test developer’s laboratory and are generally regulated
by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services under the Clinical
216
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA). Unlike the
rigorous regulatory approach taken by the FDA for test kits, “CLIA
takes a process-oriented approach that focuses on factors such as
credentials of laboratory personnel and laboratory testing
217
procedures.” Consequently, the cost of developing LDTs is modest
218
compared to the cost of developing test kits.
209. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 90.
210. See Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,463, 34,463 (June 17,
2010) (notice of public meeting and request for comments) (soliciting comments on proposals to
increase the regulation of laboratory-developed tests (LDTs)).
211. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO THE
CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 3, 21 (2008).
212. Id. at 3.
213. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006); see also SEC’Y’S
ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 34 (discussing the FDA’s
regulation of test kits).
214. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 211, at 29.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat.
2903 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2006)).
217. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 211, at 30.
218. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 34. The
SACGHS calculates that “the cost of developing a laboratory-developed genetic test that relies
on gene sequencing as opposed to probe hybridization to detect a single mutation is, on average,
between $8,000 and $10,000.” Id. The cost for gaining approval of a test kit is significantly
higher. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 180, at 5 (noting that development of the genetic diagnostic
tests at issue in Myriad was financed by $22 million in private venture capital); Frost & Sullivan,

SCHILLING IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

11/11/2011 8:37:32 PM

DNA AS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

761

Commentators, however, have increasingly called for the FDA
to exert greater regulatory control over all genetic diagnostic tests,
219
including LDTs. The rationale is that “diagnostic tests are playing
an increasingly important role in clinical decisionmaking and disease
220
management” and, thus, that significant consequences could result
if the tests are inaccurate:
False positive results can lead to unnecessary confirmatory testing,
unnecessary treatment that can be invasive or have harmful side
effects, and/or unnecessary psychological trauma . . . . False negative
results can lead to a delay in establishing the correct diagnosis,
failure to start or continue needed treatment, false security that may
prevent timely follow-up and retesting, and contribute to the
221
potential spread of infectious agents to others.

In response, the FDA announced its intention to make regulatory
222
changes in the genetic-testing industry.
The upshot of the FDA’s new position will likely be a more
expensive process for developing genetic diagnostic tests, particularly
223
LDTs. The FDA appears to believe that a risk-based regulatory
Opportunities and Growth Strategies for the APAC IVD Industry, SLIDESHARE, 16, http://www.
slideshare.net/FrostandSullivan/diagnostic-world-asia-apac-ivd-outlook-2010 (last visited Nov.
9, 2011) (calculating the average diagnostic-development cost to be approximately $40 million).
219. See, e.g., SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 211,
at 8 (concluding that to ensure proper oversight of clinical validity, the “FDA should address all
laboratory tests in a manner that takes advantage of its current experience in evaluating
laboratory tests”).
220. Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,463, 34,463 (June 17, 2010)
(notice of public meeting and request for comments).
221. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC (IVD) DEVICE
STUDIES—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm071230
.pdf. The potential for inaccuracy and inconsistency is demonstrated by a study comparing
diagnostic tests for thirteen diseases from two different test providers. This study found that
“only two-thirds of relative risk predictions qualitatively agree between [the providers] when
averaged across [the] five [tested] individuals.” Pauline C. Ng, Sarah S. Murray, Samuel Levy &
J. Craig Venter, An Agenda for Personalized Medicine, 461 NATURE 724, 724 (2009).
222. See Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,464 (“[T]he agency
believes it is time to reconsider its policy of enforcement discretion over LDTs. The public must
be assured that the tests used in the provision of health care, whether developed by a laboratory
or other manufacturer, are safe and effective.”).
223. See Letter from Daryl Pritchard, Dir., Research Programs Advocacy, Biotechnology
Indus. Org., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. 3 (Aug. 15, 2010) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“This shift from the current system, under which FDA has exercised
enforcement discretion with respect to LDTs while laboratories have continued to be regulated
under CLIA, will have an impact on the cost of development and ongoing compliance . . . .”).
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224

framework is appropriate. Although it is unclear what such a
framework would entail, a comparison to the medical-device
225
226
framework used for test kits suggests that it would likely be costly.
Consequently, arguments for more stringent patenting standards or
exemptions in the context of genetic diagnostic tests may soon no
longer be valid insofar as those arguments are premised on the idea
that LDTs are “inexpensively designed, developed, and validated”
227
because they “do not undergo FDA clearance.”
The SACGHS claims that, notwithstanding the FDA’s position
and the more extensive regulatory framework that could result from
it, exclusive rights will not be necessary for the development of
228
genetic diagnostic tests. In support of its position, the SACGHS
cites a case study on genetic testing for cystic fibrosis that shows that
229
multiple parties have developed test kits with nonexclusive licenses.
Because test kits are subject to FDA approval, the SACGHS believes
230
that this study suggests that exclusive rights are unnecessary.
Nevertheless, many others disagree and believe that without exclusive
rights, there will usually be insufficient incentive to develop genetic

224. See Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,464 (“At this time,
FDA believes that a risk-based application of oversight to LDTs is the appropriate approach to
achieve the desired public health goals . . . .”). But see Sharon Goswami & Dan Vorhaus, News
Roundup: Biotech Funding and LDT Regulation, GENOMICS L. REP. (May 5, 2011), http://www.
genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/05/05/news-roundup-biotech-funding-and-ldt-regulation
(providing examples of alternative approaches being considered).
225. See Allain Andry & Dan Vorhaus, The Business Effects of Regulatory Uncertainty in
Genetic Testing, GENOMICS L. REP. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index
.php/2010/08/31/the-business-effects-of-regulatory-uncertainty-in-genetic-testing (“The most
common category of medical device is a medium-risk . . . device . . . which . . . . [i]n the case of
[IVD] devices . . . requires, among other things, (i) considering whether there is a ‘predicate
device’ on which a 510(k) application could be based, (ii) generating both analytical and clinical
data to support an FDA application and (iii) preparing to manufacture the devices and operate
laboratories under compliance and inspection regimes that are likely to be more demanding
than the currently-applicable CLIA compliance requirements.”).
226. See supra note 218.
227. See R.D. Klein, Legal Developments and Practical Implications of Gene Patenting on
Targeted Drug Discovery and Development, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
633, 633 (2010) (discussing the higher costs of developing therapeutics for market as opposed to
genetic tests).
228. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 35.
229. Id. at 34–35 (citing Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Christopher Heaney, Tamara James,
Chris Conover & Robert Cook-Deegan, Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on
Access to Genetic Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 12 GENETICS MED. S194 (2010)).
230. Id. at 34.
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231

diagnostic tests. In view of the notable effects of exclusive licensing
232
in other contexts, it is likely that exclusive rights provide a critical
economic incentive in the context of genetic diagnostic tests as well.
2. Exemption for Research Purposes. Although the SACGHS
recommends an exemption for the use of patent-protected genes in
the pursuit of research, it does not provide details on how such
research would be defined. In failing to do so, the SACGHS
233
consequently fails to establish clearly the limits of the exemption.
Although several types of statutory research exemptions have been
suggested elsewhere, each proposal has drawn a different line
234
between exempt and nonexempt research. For example, some
proposed research exemptions focus on differentiating between
235
commercial and noncommercial research, exempting only the latter.
231. See, e.g., Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413,
18,414 (Apr. 11, 2005) (notice) (“Practical realization of [benefits arising from biomedical
innovation] depends on the ability and willingness of private sector partners to develop and
commercialize new technologies . . . . For potential preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic
products, the interest of the private sector in commercializing new technologies often depends
on the existence of patent protection . . . .”). Even the American Medical Association has
recognized the important role of patents in the development of genetic test kits subject to FDA
approval. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. in Support of
Respondents at 13, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) (“[P]atents can
enhance the provision of high-quality and cost-effective medical care. The financial incentive
offered by patents supports the expensive and uncertain research required to identify, test, and
gain approval for products such as new pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and diagnostic testing
kits. In this respect, the patent system has served patients and the medical profession well.”
(emphasis added)).
232. Exclusive licensing has played an important role in other contexts such as the BayhDole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212
(2006)). The Bayh-Dole Act has stimulated the commercialization of government-funded
scientific breakthroughs in part by allowing federal contractors to grant exclusive licenses for
patented inventions whose research and development has been funded by the government. See
BAYHDOLE25, INC., THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AT 25, at 13, 20 (2006), available at http://
bayhdolecentral.com/BayhDole25_WhitePaper.pdf (explaining that before the Bayh-Dole
Act—which “granted federal contractors the authority to grant exclusive patent licenses”—
“rights belong[ed] to everyone, [so] no one had sufficient incentive to bring innovations to
market”).
233. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 95–96
(discussing the suggested exemption at only a broad level).
234. Although there is a common-law research exemption, it is too narrow for this context.
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[S]o long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.”).
235. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1034–35 (1989) (discussing a previously proposed
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The idea behind this type of exemption is that the patent holder’s
interest will not be harmed if the patented invention is used merely
236
for noncommercial research. Others advocate for exemptions for
237
research on a patented invention but not with a patented invention.
Arguably, this type of exemption would be beneficial in the context of
genetic testing because it would allow “[r]esearch and development to
make testing more comprehensive, more accurate or less expensive,”
238
thereby improving testing quality.
One could also argue, however, that a de jure exemption for
239
research is unnecessary because a de facto exemption already exists.
Myriad has maintained that it never enforces its patents against
researchers or against test providers offering services or forms of tests
240
that Myriad does not offer. In addition, researchers tend to ignore
241
third-party patents. But some commentators note that, even if these
statements are true, “Myriad [has] never publicly stated its de facto
research use exemption policy” and the resulting “[a]mbiguity may
itself stifle basic or clinical research as researchers either avoid the
242
work altogether or are wary of publicly reporting results.”
Moreover, there is no guarantee that Myriad’s peer companies have
243
equivalent policies. Given these concerns, a statutory research
exemption could be more effective than reliance on a de facto
exemption through corporate policies.
experimental-use exemption that “refines the no-harm standard by drawing a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial research”).
236. Id. at 1034.
237. COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC & PROTEIN RESEARCH &
INNOVATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION,
AND PUBLIC HEALTH 14 (2006), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11487.
Research on a patented invention minimally includes research to discover the validity and scope
of the patent, the characteristics and advantages of the invention, novel methods of making and
using the patented invention, and improvements or alternatives to the patented invention. Id.
238. Robert Cook-Deegan, Subhashini Chandrasekharan & Misha Angrist, The Dangers of
Diagnostic Monopolies, 485 NATURE 405, 406 (2009).
239. See Eisenberg, supra note 235, at 1034 (“Ironically, a no-harm limitation would seem to
confine the defense to situations in which it is unnecessary, since patent holders are unlikely to
bring infringement actions unless they feel harmed by the defendants’ conduct.”).
240. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 106, at S28.
241. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
242. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 106, at S28 (emphasis omitted).
243. But see generally Christopher M. Holman, Trends in Human Gene Patent Litigation,
322 SCIENCE 198 (2008) (“Human gene patent litigation invariably has involved an alleged
infringer engaged in substantial commercial activities focused specifically on the single gene that
is the subject of the asserted patent . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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The difficulty of conceiving a suitable demarcation between
exempt and nonexempt research, however, weighs more heavily
against creating a research exemption. Demarcations that have been
244
proposed thus far are not only ambiguous, but their policy
rationales are also unconvincing in some circumstances. For example,
the rationale behind the seemingly clear distinction between
commercial and noncommercial research—that noncommercial
research does not harm a patent holder’s interests—breaks down
when the market for a patented invention is for its use as a research
tool, in which case exempting research users would potentially
245
destroy the market for the patented invention.
The rationale behind the distinction between research with and
research on also breaks down in some situations. If research on a
patented invention were exempt, a patent holder’s interests would
initially seem to be protected because researchers would have to
acquire a license from the patent holder before marketing subsequent
246
improvements that fall within the patent’s scope. Such research,
however, might also result in a noninfringing substitute for the
patented technology, which, if commercially exploited, would
undermine the patent holder’s ability to earn an adequate return on
247
his investment.
Ultimately, these and other proposed lines between exempt and
nonexempt research are nebulous and difficult to define. More
importantly, data suggest that a de facto research exemption already
248
exists: researchers tend to ignore patents, and patent holders tend

244. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 102, at 25 (“[W]ith the increasing level of involvement
and collaboration between for-profit companies and universities, the line between basic and
commercial research is blurring.”).
245. See Eisenberg, supra note 235, at 1035 (“[F]or inventions with significant markets
among researchers, such as patented laboratory techniques and other research tools, exempting
even purely academic researchers from the patent monopoly could deprive patent holders of a
portion of the monopoly profits they might otherwise expect to earn and thereby reduce
incentives to make and disclose such inventions in the future.” (footnote omitted)).
246. See id. at 1076 (“[I]f a subsequent researcher develops an improvement that falls within
the scope of the claims of the earlier patent, the financial interests of the patent holder may be
adequately protected by allowing enforcement of the patent after the research is completed
when the improvement is ready for commercial exploitation.”).
247. See id. (“[I]f the subsequent researcher is able to develop a substitute technology that
does not infringe the patent claims, denying the patent holder a remedy for the research use
could prevent the patent holder from earning an adequate return on the initial investment in
developing the earlier patented invention.”).
248. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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not to enforce their patents against researchers. Given the linedrawing problems and the evidence suggesting that research has not
been substantially hindered, any slight benefits created by a statutory
research exemption are not enough to justify establishing such an
exemption.
III. A NARROWLY TAILORED SOLUTION
Although it is debatable whether the concerns underlying gene
patents are sufficiently well founded to warrant a response by
Congress or the courts, the Myriad I holding and the exemptions
recommended by the SACGHS go too far. Myriad I, by broadly
250
holding that isolated DNA is not patentable subject matter, ignored
both the reality that isolated DNA has important characteristics that
251
make it vitally different from native DNA and the importance of
252
gene patents in the biotechnology industry. Moreover, the fact that
courts are rightly beginning to enforce the utility and nonobviousness
standards more strictly in the context of gene patents makes Myriad
253
I’s drastic response inadvisable and unnecessary. The SACGHS
recommendations for patient-care and research exemptions are not
much better. These recommendations would eliminate important
development incentives for genetic diagnostic tests by removing
protections for what are often the only envisioned uses for a patent254
protected gene and would not give enough consideration to the
increased costs and burdens that might develop under a new FDA
255
regulatory framework for genetic diagnostic tests.
Ultimately,
neither the Myriad I solution nor the SACGHS solution is an
appropriate response to the unique problems posed by gene patents.
And although Myriad II largely corrected the problems that would
256
have been created by Myriad I, it did not consider whether the
inconclusive data underlying the alleged problems created by gene

249. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. See supra Part II.A.2.
253. See supra Part I.C.2–3.
254. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part II.B.1.
256. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 192–201 and
accompanying text.
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patents might eventually warrant a more precise response than the
257
Myriad I holding.
The narrowly tailored approach proposed by this Note would
better address the unique challenges created by gene patents without
adversely affecting the incentives for the development of therapeutics
and diagnostics resulting from DNA-based innovations. This
approach consists of two prongs: (1) addressing patient-access and
standard-of-care concerns by gathering more information to
determine whether future exemptions for confirmatory diagnostic
testing or whole-genome sequencing might be warranted and
(2) addressing research and innovation concerns by increasing
transparency in genetic diagnostic testing, gene patents, and licensing.
A. Addressing the Alleged Problems of Patient Access and Standard
of Care
The SACGHS recommendation of a broad exemption for genepatent infringement for patient-care purposes mirrors a preexisting
exemption for the performance of patented medical procedures by
258
Although this broad exemption is ill
medical practitioners.
259
conceived in the context of gene patents, narrower exemptions have
also been proposed in which otherwise-infringing activity would be
260
exempted only in specific patient-care circumstances. As Congress
has recognized, however, more information is needed before

257. See Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If the law is to be changed . . . the
decision must come not from the courts, but from Congress.”).
258. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006) (“With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance
of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement . . . the [remedy] provisions . . . shall not
apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such
medical activity.”). “[M]edical activity” does not encompass “(i) the use of a patented machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented
use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in
violation of a biotechnology patent,” id. § 287(c)(2), thereby precluding application to genetic
diagnostic tests.
259. See supra Part II.B.1.
260. See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 238, at 406 (proposing that “[p]atient rights should
trump patent rights” when “[p]erforming a test in a form that [the exclusive rights holder] does
not offer,” “[t]esting in a territory where the company does not offer a test but has exclusive
rights,” or “[g]etting second opinions or verification testing”); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Turning
Patent Swords into Shares, 330 SCIENCE 1630, 1630 (2010) (recommending an exemption
“restricted to clinicians using their own ‘homemade’ gene-based tests”).
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261

considering any new exemptions. Depending on what is shown by
that information, two possible exemptions could prove to be
beneficial: (1) a limited exemption for providing second opinions and
(2) a limited exemption for whole-genome sequencing.
1. Exemption for Second Opinions. If properly limited, the first
type of exemption—an exemption for second opinions—would
address the concern that patients do not have access to important
second opinions, but would not deprive patent holders of their
262
investment-backed expectations.
The SACGHS argues that a
limited exemption like this would not be effective “because there
would be little incentive, and many disincentives, for a laboratory to
develop and maintain a test simply to provide second opinions or
263
verification requests.”
But this argument is contradicted by
statements in the same report regarding the ease of developing these
264
tests. Nevertheless, the concern is valid, as costs will likely increase
265
if the FDA expands its regulation of genetic diagnostic tests. These
costs, however, could be kept in check if the FDA adopted a lower
threshold for the approval of confirmatory tests, which is possible if it
266
follows through on its apparent plan to adopt a risk-based approach.
For such an exemption to provide the intended benefits, however, the

261. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 27(b), 125 Stat. 284, 338
(2011) (mandating a study on, among other things, the need for independent, second-opinion
genetic diagnostic tests and the effect such an exemption would have on rights holders).
262. See John Conley & Dan Vorhaus, House Introduces Patent Reform Proposal To Permit
Second Opinions in Genetic Diagnostic Testing, GENOMICS L. REP. (June 15, 2011), http://www.
genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/06/15/house-introduces-patent-reform-proposal-topermit-second-opinions-in-genetic-diagnostic-testing (providing an analysis of a proposed but
ultimately unenacted portion of an amendment to the House version of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act). The proposed amendment would have limited the exemption in several
ways. It would have, for example, permitted genetic diagnostic testing for the sole purpose of
confirming another test provider’s results only under circumstances in which confirmation is not
already available from another provider under a patent license. Id. In addition, the proposed
amendment would have ensured that the patent holder or licensee would be the first option for
future retesting conducted to monitor medical status, and it would have put the burden on the
infringer to prove the applicability of the exemption. Id. With limitations such as these and
others like them, patent holders would not be deprived of any of the expected benefits of their
patents: the only exempt tests would be those second-opinion tests that the patent holders
themselves could not provide. Id.
263. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 48.
264. E.g., id. at 34 (“The costs of developing these laboratory-developed tests appear to be
relatively modest.”).
265. See supra Part II.B.1.
266. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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hurdle of regulatory approval would have to be low enough that
potential confirmatory-test providers would be encouraged to
develop tests that are not merely exact replicas of the initial test, thus
providing more robust and effective confirmatory tests.
2. Exemption for Whole-Genome Sequencing. The second type
of potentially beneficial exemption would address a problem that may
267
be looming on the horizon: whole-genome sequencing. Though it is
far from clear whether whole-genome sequencing will infringe the
268
thousands of gene patents that already exist, this is one area in
which the threat of a detrimental holdup due to a patent thicket is
269
real. If gene patents are shown to erect an insurmountable barrier
to whole-genome sequencing as it becomes more commercially
270
viable, a narrow exemption could be created for whole-genomesequencing diagnostic tests. Under such an exemption, infringers
could be allowed to offer whole-genome-sequencing tests under the
condition that they provide notice and pay a percentage of their
271
profits to gene-patent rights holders.
Several practical difficulties would arise in applying such an
exemption. One difficulty would be determining what percentage of

267. See Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]he court’s decision will likely have broad consequences, such as
preempting methods for whole-genome sequencing . . . .”); SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 58–59 (noting that “affordable clinical wholegenome sequencing is on the horizon” and expressing concern that “a [gene] patent thicket
could delay or prevent [its] development”).
268. See Dan Vorhaus & John Conley, Whole-Genome Sequencing and Gene Patents Coexist
(for Now), GENOMICS L. REP. (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/
2009/08/11/whole-genome-sequencing-and-gene-patents-coexist-for-now (concluding that “[t]he
answer is not entirely clear”).
269. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 58–59.
Though it would also theoretically be possible to solve the whole-genome-sequencing problem
with judicially imposed compulsory licenses under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006), the awards—when multiplied by hundreds or thousands of different patent
holders—would likely become cost prohibitive.
270. See, e.g., Matthew Dublin, Researchers Demonstrate Feasibility of Whole-Genome
Sequencing in the Clinic, GENOMEWEB (Apr. 2011), http://www.genomeweb.com/sequencing/
researchers-demonstrate-feasibility-whole-genome-sequencing-clinic (“The [research] team
successfully sequenced tumor and normal cells from a male patient with pancreatic cancer,
making him the first patient at the Mayo Clinic to undergo whole-genome sequencing. . . . [This
study] also demonstrated that whole-genome sequencing can be utilized in the clinic in a timely
fashion.”).
271. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (creating compulsory licensing for the making and
distributing of phonorecords of copyrighted, nondramatic musical works that have been publicly
distributed).
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profits the compulsory license should require. Because of the
potentially large number of gene patents that would need to be
licensed, the percentage would have to small enough that whole272
genome sequencing would still be commercially feasible. Moreover,
it would be prohibitively expensive to insist that whole-genomesequencing providers search for the thousands of patents that they
273
might be infringing and then serve notice to each patent holder. To
minimize this problem, a central collecting agency could be created,
and the burden could lie with patent holders to prove their
274
entitlement to a share of the license fees.
Ultimately, these exemptions may be unnecessary. It is unclear
how often second-opinion options are unavailable or how often
confirmatory diagnostic testing is used even when such tests do exist.
Similarly, it is unclear whether gene patents will be infringed when
whole-genome sequencing becomes commercially viable. But before
any new exemptions are considered, these issues must be resolved.
B. Addressing the Alleged Problem of Hindered Research and
Innovation
A unique problem with gene patents is that they cover not only
commercial therapeutic and diagnostic products but also research
275
tools. Because gene patents do not draw a distinction between these
two categories, one concern is that they might impede research and
276
innovation. One way of addressing this concern would be to make
isolated DNA unpatentable, thereby pushing patents downstream so
277
that they encompass only specific uses or applications of DNA. This
272. See Sam Kean, The Human Genome (Patent) Project, 331 SCIENCE 530, 531 (2011)
(discussing the problem of “royalty stacking” in this context by noting that “[i]f 50 companies
each want 2% of net profits, that’s not a good business model”).
273. See id. at 530 (estimating that for a set of approximately one hundred genes relevant to
cancer, “[i]nvestigating all the relevant patent claims (issued and pending) for possible
infringement would cost at least $35 million”).
274. See id. at 531 (“One solution could involve an independent clearinghouse to manage
intellectual property, which could reduce the cost of compliance by providing a single place to
find patents and licenses.”).
275. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
277. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of
Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 902 (2006) (“One
approach, recently enacted in Germany for genomic patents, is to limit the patentee to the use
recited in the patent—that is, to use the utility requirement as the measure of scope. For
example, if the patentee claims that the sequence can be used to diagnose a susceptibility to
Condition X, then the patent covers only diagnosis of X.”).
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278

solution, however, is not ideal. Given the uncertainty inherent in
biotechnology research and development, and given the risk involved
in the time-intensive and costly process of translating basic research
into marketable products, patent protection needs to be secured at a
stage early enough to make the required private investment
279
feasible. In the context of genes, this early stage may come before it
is even known whether the highest-value use would be in diagnostics,
280
protein therapeutics, RNAi therapeutics, or elsewhere.
Consequently, this solution, like the research exemptions discussed in
281
Part II, is not advisable, particularly given the uncertainty about
whether gene patents are in fact significantly hindering research and
282
innovation.
Research and innovation could still be bolstered, however, by
increased transparency in genetic diagnostic testing, gene patents, and
licensing. The SACGHS, in a report on the oversight of genetic
testing, recommends “a mandatory, publicly available, Web-based
283
registry” that would include all laboratory tests. The database
would contain “data elements associated with analytical validity,
284
clinical validity, clinical utility, and accessibility.”
This concept could be even more beneficial if expanded. For
example, the database could contain information on all human-gene
patents—not just the already-available information on the scope and
length of time of patent protection and patent-holder identity, but

278. See supra note 201. This type of change might also be superfluous because, as the prior
art grows, more patent applicants will likely find it necessary to make narrower claims directed
to specific uses. See Berman & Dreyfuss, supra note 277, at 903 (“[I]t may be that most
patentees would not be able to claim products, and would instead be limited by the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements to patents on specific processes.”).
279. See supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also Berman & Dreyfuss, supra note
277, at 903 (“[N]arrowing patent scope could set a precedent that will make investors
wary . . . .”).
280. See Donald Zuhn, BIO Comes Out Swinging Against SACGHS Report—Updated, PAT.
DOCS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/02/bio-comes-out-swinging-against-sacghsreport.html (discussing how “when [HGS] first identified the [bliss] gene, it did not know
whether its value would lie in diagnostics, as a target to generate small molecule therapeutics, in
its encoded protein, or in antibodies directed to that protein” and how the development of the
lupus drug that ultimately resulted from the discovery required expenditures of “some $2 billion
on a number of programs, the majority of which failed after reaching the clinic or which never
made it out of the lab”).
281. See supra Part II.B.2.
282. See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
283. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, supra note 211, at 8.
284. Id.
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also information on whether the patent has been licensed and to
whom, whether that license is exclusive or nonexclusive, and what the
285
scope of the field of use is for that license. Some commentators have
even suggested that license terms be made publicly available, thereby
286
creating a more efficient market for patents. By making this type of
information easily accessible, even without license terms, costs in
287
clinical laboratories could be reduced, and interested parties would
have a better idea of where new opportunities for licenses and new
innovation exist.
CONCLUSION
Developments
such
as
the
SACGHS
gene-patent
recommendations and the Myriad case have made the patentability of
genes a highly visible issue. Because of the controversial nature of
gene patents and the strong opinions that they engender, these
developments largely amount to overreactions that would do more
harm than good. Broadly precluding patent protection for isolated
DNA, as was suggested in Myriad I, would threaten to unravel sectors
of the biotechnology industry. The SACGHS recommendation of
broad exemptions for genetic testing for the purposes of both
research and patient care would be no better, as these purposes are
often the primary commercial uses envisioned by patent holders.
Without the guarantee of exclusivity in these markets, patent holders
will be unlikely to invest in the development and commercialization
of genetic diagnostic tests, especially with the possibility of increased
FDA regulation on the horizon.
Instead, it is advisable to consider alternative solutions that more
directly and precisely address the primary concerns surrounding gene
patents: impeded research and impeded patient access to high-quality
genetic diagnostic tests. Gathering appropriate information will

285. This type of idea has been suggested by others. See Jeffrey L. Furman, Fiona Murray &
Scott Stern, More for the Research Dollar, 468 NATURE 757, 758 (2010) (“A standardized,
accessible database of such transactions . . . would reduce future transaction costs for innovators
trying to build on ideas with many different patented elements.”).
286. See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How To Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 257, 258 (2007) (“[Requiring publication of patent assignment and license terms] will
help rationalize patent transactions, turning them from secret, one-off negotiations into a real,
working market for patents. And by making it clear to courts and the world at large what the
normal price is for patent rights, it will make it that much harder for a few unscrupulous patent
owners to hold up legitimate innovators . . . .”).
287. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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facilitate a determination of whether limited exemptions for
confirmatory diagnostic testing and whole-genome sequencing might
be particularly beneficial. Furthermore, increased transparency would
facilitate increased innovation, which may in turn improve both the
standard of care and patient access by driving costs down. These
solutions strike an appropriate balance between ensuring maximum
patient access to high-quality, gene-based technologies and
maintaining the protection and incentives needed to create and
develop those technologies in the first place.

